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FROM OBSESSION TO CONFESSION: 
A FALSE CONFESSION PARADIGM 





In this study, we used a fact pattern similar to the John Mark Karr scenario to 
examine perceptions of DNA and confession evidence. Specifi cally, we hypoth-
esized that DNA evidence, confessor level of psychopathology, and presence or 
absence of Miranda protections would affect participants’ perceptions of guilt 
and attitudes towards the interrogation process. One hundred nine undergraduates 
read a two-page summary based on John Mark Karr’s confession. Summaries 
varied based on psychopathology of confessor, the presence or absence of DNA 
evidence, and the provision of Miranda warnings prior to confession. The DNA 
manipulation explained participants’ attitudes towards specifi c aspects of the in-
terrogation process. The importance of perceptions of forensic type evidence, spe-
cifi cally DNA, in our legal system is discussed. 
INTRODUCTION
Psychological evaluation of interrogations and the confes-
sions they often produce has resulted in a signifi cant number of 
published studies (Forrest, Wadkins, & Larson, 2006; Kassin & 
Gudjonsson, 2004; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Kassin & McNall, 
1991; Gudjonsson, 2006; Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005; Leo, 
1996; Ofshe & Leo, 1997). These studies have provided valuable in-
sight into why an innocent person would confess to a heinous crime. 
To date, however, no studies have investigated voluntary confes-
sions and the factors involved in their evaluations. Although infre-
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Morgan S. Moffa, 
or Judith Platania, Roger Williams University, One Old Ferry Road, Bristol, RI 02809; 
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quent, voluntary self-incrimination occurs, and the false confession 
of John Mark Karr to the murder of JonBenet Ramsey has brought 
national attention to this legal and psychological event.
In his confession to JonBenet Ramsey’s homicide, John 
Mark Karr offered himself to law enforcement as the killer by pro-
viding a voluntary confession. Lack of DNA evidence linking John 
Mark Karr to JonBenet Ramsey prevented the prosecution from tak-
ing this case to trial. Mr. Karr’s legal status would almost certainly 
be different if he had provided his confession 25 years ago. At the 
time, DNA evidence was not yet an available and reliable form of 
evidence. As a result, this type of forensic evidence was not nec-
essary to obtain a conviction. Today, however, DNA evidence can 
provide defi nitive proof of guilt or innocence. 
The Warren Court’s due-process revolution (Epstein & 
Walker, 2000), case law (Brown v. Mississippi, 1936; Colorado 
v. Connelly, 1986; Miranda v. Arizona, 1966), and social change 
(Bonsignore et al., 1989) have altered how we examine and evalu-
ate confession evidence. We have moved from the assumption that a 
confession equates guilt to a search for additional evidence in order 
to confi rm the validity of a confession. In John Mark Karr’s case, his 
confession became a necessary, although not suffi cient prerequisite 
for guilt. Specifi c corroborative evidence was needed, and the focus 
was on DNA confi rmation. Research has found, however, that testi-
mony alone lacks the power of DNA evidence. In a study conducted 
by Moffa (2006), corroboration in the form of testimony evidence 
was insuffi cient to convince participant-jurors of a confessor’s guilt 
when no forensic-type evidence was available. This result shows a 
shift in our system of jurisprudence from the absolute belief in con-
fession evidence to a more balanced evaluation of believability and 
confi rmation (McCormick, 1972). 
The Karr paradigm raises questions for an empirical evalu-
ation of the voluntary confession: How are perceptions of a volun-
tary confession affected by DNA evidence, Miranda warnings, and 
mental illness? In the present study, we manipulated DNA corrobo-
ration, presence or absence of Miranda protections, and confessor 
level of psychopathology portrayed in the confession. We were pri-
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marily interested in the impact of these factors on verdict, as well 
as perceptions of the reliability and probative validity of DNA and 
confession evidence.
Psychopathology
Psychopathology is an important consideration in evaluating 
factors in various adjudicative contexts. Yarvis (2000) investigated 
psychological characteristics of defendants found guilty of a capital 
offense and the effect of psychopathology on prosecutorial and juror 
discretion. Defendants described as having poor reality testing, poor 
impulse control, or a history of physical abuse during childhood 
were most likely to be qualifi ed as “special” and were more likely 
to receive a sentence other than death. In this study, jurors perceived 
mental illness as a robust mitigating factor in sentencing. As a result, 
signifi cant effects were observed for qualitatively severe mental ill-
ness, such as a psychotic diagnosis. Conversely, Cochrane, Grisso, 
and Frederick (2001) examined the effect of diagnosis on pretrial 
disposition concerning competency to stand trial. Their fi ndings in-
dicated schizophrenia as the most likely diagnosis stemming from 
a competency evaluation. When prior fi ndings on the relationship 
between perceptions of culpability and mental illness are interpreted 
in the context of a voluntary confession, it is reasonable to predict 
psychopathology would diminish the believability of the confes-
sor. It is also reasonable to predict psychopathology would enhance 
perceptions of culpability, as individuals with mental illness are 
considered dangerous (Monahan, et al., 2001). In the context of the 
present study, we predicted attitudes towards the interrogation proc-
ess would differ as a function of confessor psychopathology and 
provisions of Miranda warnings. 
Miranda Warnings
In Colorado v. Connelly (1986), Connelly voluntarily re-
ported a homicide he had committed to Denver police. He waived 
his Miranda warning prior to confessing, and by all outward appear-
ances, his confession was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Upon 
psychiatric evaluation, it was shown that Connelly was suffering 
from active psychotic symptoms at the time of his Miranda waiver 
and confession. From a clinical perspective, Connelly’s judgment 
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was grossly impaired and cast doubt on the fi delity of the waiver 
and confession. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that 
Connelly’s 5th Amendment due process right had not been violated. 
In the eyes of the law this meant that the absence of coercive inter-
rogation practices demonstrated free will in offering a confession. 
Therefore, mental status or diagnosis was not dispositive for ques-
tions of voluntariness. For mentally incompetent individuals, this 
decision called into question legal protections against self-incrimi-
nation and Miranda warnings (Cheney, 1987). 
Colorado illustrates the interaction of psychopathology and 
Miranda waivers in the context of a voluntary confession. The con-
fessor had received the diagnosis of schizophrenia and had untreat-
ed symptoms at the time he confessed to a police offi cer he found 
on the street. The Miranda waiver was ultimately found to be valid 
and the confession was admissible, in part because no outside coer-
cion was evident. The present study will test whether participants’ 
perceptions of a Miranda waiver and confessor differ from the legal 
opinion of circumstances surrounding the waiver and confession in 
Connelly. 
DNA Evidence
Media exposure to sophisticated forensic evidence, specifi -
cally DNA, has altered public perceptions of forensic-type evidence’s 
reliability and utility to demonstrate a defendant’s guilt or innocence 
(Moffa & Platania, 2007; Stinson, Smith, Patry, Fitzsimmons, & 
Finney, 2006). Given the probabilistic nature of forensic DNA anal-
ysis error (e.g., one in one million), this evidence is afforded a status 
of high reliability (Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak, Djadali, & Sanchez, 
2000; Schklar & Diamond, 1999). Jurors, however, may have dif-
fi culty differentiating a highly reliable method of placing a defend-
ant at the scene of a crime from one that demonstrates culpability. 
Criminal trials involving confessions may or may not include this 
type of forensic evidence. Likewise, a confession’s validity may or 
may not be called into question (e.g., motion to suppress). The poten-
tial interaction of these evidence factors raises questions regarding 
their importance to jurors’ decision making. In the present study, we 
predicted a result consistent with the CSI effect; i.e., that there will 
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be an overestimation of forensic evidence reliability (Smith, Stinson, 
& Patry, 2007; Stinson, Smith, Patry, Fitzsimmons, & Finey, 2005). 
In other words, forensic evidence like DNA may have a signifi cant 
impact on participants’ perceptions of guilt, and therefore co-vary 
with other factors like psychopathology and Miranda waivers. 
The current study examines the relationship between psy-
chopathology, Miranda waiver, and DNA evidence matching the 
voluntary confessor. To date, no research has addressed the issue of 
perceptions of voluntary confessions when the confessor is prima 
facie disbelieved. Additionally, we were interested in opinions about 
these factors outside of this paradigm. To this end, we apportioned 
part of our sample (n= 74) as a “survey only” condition.
Hypothesis 1: We predicted items measuring confessor guilt, 
validity of confession, and evaluations of DNA and confession evi-
dence would differ as a function of DNA corroboration (matching or 
not matching the confessor). 
Hypothesis 2: We predicted items measuring attitudes to-
wards the interrogation of mentally ill suspects and Miranda would 
differ as a function of confessor psychopathology and provision of 
Miranda warnings. 
Hypothesis 3: Experimental and survey only conditions 
would differ in evaluations of confession and DNA evidence. 
METHOD
Participants
A convenience sample of one hundred eighty-two undergrad-
uates (108 female, 74 male) participated in this study in exchange 
for course credit. All participants were between the ages of 17-34. 
Ninety-four percent were Caucasian and unmarried. More than half 
of the sample were politically liberal (68%); 30% were conserva-
tive. Fifty-four percent reported being related to a law enforcement 
offi cer. All participants were treated in accordance with APA ethical 
considerations. 
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Materials
Stimulus materials included a two-page summary depicting 
a voluntary confession. The Appendix displays one variation of our 
manipulation: italicized information denotes our independent vari-
ables. In order to preserve the ecological validity of the stimulus ma-
terials, level of psychopathology was operationalized as the specifi c 
characteristics put forward in the actual case. This meant presenting 
some of the behaviors listed as the diagnostic criteria for pedophilia 
(DSM-IV, 1994, p. 571-572). 
Our dependent variables consisted of a twenty-six item ques-
tionnaire measuring evaluations of: confessor’s guilt, validity of the 
confession, reliability of confession and DNA evidence, Miranda 
issues, and the process of interrogation and confession involving a 
suspect with a mental illness. Some participants (n = 74) served as a 
comparison group (“survey only” condition) completing only items 
concerning reliability and probative-validity of DNA and confes-
sion evidence, as well as attitudes towards interrogating mentally ill 
suspects. 
Design and Procedure
After participants provided consent, the experimental group 
(n = 109) fi rst read the confession summary and responded to items 
relating to the facts of the summary and demographics. Summaries 
varied based on presence or absence of corroborative DNA evidence, 
provision of Miranda warnings prior to confession, and psychopa-
thology evidenced by confessor. All other information remained 
constant. Participants in the survey only condition (n = 74) did not 
receive stimulus materials and completed only those items related 
to the reliability and validity of confession and DNA evidence, at-
titudes towards Miranda, and interrogations of mentally ill suspects. 
Summaries represented a 2 (DNA: match or no match) x 2 (psy-
chopathology: demonstrated or not) x 2 (Miranda: provided or not) 
between-subjects design. Survey only data was examined as a third 
level of each independent variable. 
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RESULTS
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1 was supported. Log-linear analysis revealed a 
signifi cant association of DNA condition with the item “true or false 
confession,” χ2(1, N = 107) = 6.54, p = .011. When DNA matched 
the confessor, 37% of participants believed the confession was true; 
when DNA did not match, only 13% believed it was true. 
A signifi cant association was also revealed for psychopa-
thology with the item “true or false confession,” χ2(1, N = 107) = 
5.01, p = .025. Thirty-one percent of participants in the psychopa-
thology condition believed the confession was true, compared to 
13% in the no psychopathology condition. A signifi cant effect was 
found for DNA on verdict, χ2(1, N = 107) = 19.88, p = .000. When 
DNA matched the confessor, 72% of participants found the confes-
sor guilty, compared to 22% when DNA did not match. 
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. Univariate ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of psychopathology on the item “a mentally 
ill person should not be interrogated,” F(1, 178) = 3.58, p = .032, 
η2 = .03. On a scale of 0 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree, 
agreement was strongest in the no psychopathology condition (M = 
3.91) compared to psychopathology (M = 1.98).   
Univariate ANOVA revealed a signifi cant DNA x Miranda 
interaction on the item “obtaining a confession is more important 
than providing Miranda protections,” F(1, 175) = 4.94, p = .027, η2 
= .02. Participant agreement was highest in conditions where DNA 
corroborated the confession and Miranda warnings were provided. 
See Table 1 [opposite] for display of interaction means.
Hypothesis 3 was partially supported. One-way ANOVA re-
vealed a main effect for DNA on the item “how reliable is DNA 
evidence,” F(2, 179) = 5.45, p = .005. Scheffé’s test of multiple 
comparisons revealed signifi cant differences between survey only 
(M = 6.24) and DNA No Match condition (M = 5.65) at p = .008. 
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One-way ANOVA showed a main effect for DNA on the item 
“how reliable is confession evidence,” F(2, 179) = 12.55, p = .000. 
Scheffé’s test of multiple comparison revealed survey only condi-
tion differed signifi cantly from DNA Match and No Match condi-
tions (Ms = 4.24 vs. 3.22 and 3.15, respectively) at p = .000. DNA 
was perceived as more reliable outside the context of this scenario.
One-way ANOVA revealed a main effect for DNA on the 
item “how probative is confession evidence,” F(2, 179) = 3.51, p 
= .032. Scheffé’s test of multiple comparisons revealed signifi cant 
differences between survey only and DNA No Match condition (Ms 
= 4.12 vs. 3.43, respectively) p = .034. Overall, differences between 
survey only and experimental conditions were a function of DNA 
corroboration. All ratings were made on a scale of 0 = strongly disa-
gree to 7 = strongly agree. See Table 2 [below] for display of differ-
ences between means on these dependent measures. 
Table 1
DNA x Miranda Interaction
Obtaining a Confession is More Important than Miranda Protections 
(N = 181)
Miranda
DNA Provided Not Provided
Match 3.26 2.56
No Match 2.38 3.32
Note. Higher scores indicated agreement on a scale of 0 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree. 
Table 2
Participant Ratings of DNA and Confession Evidence: 
DNA v. Survey Condition
Participant Ratings DNA Survey
How Reliable is DNA Evidence? 5.65 6.24
How Reliable is Confession Evidence? 3.22 4.24 
How Probative is Confession Evidence? 3.43  4.12
Note: Judgments were made on 8-point scales (0 = not at all reliable/proba-
tive to 7 = very reliable/probative). Means are signifi cantly different at p < 
.05. 
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DISCUSSION
These fi ndings demonstrate the importance of forensic type 
evidence, specifi cally DNA, on judgments of verdict and evidence 
credibility. In a paradigm based on a situation involving an almost 
indisputably false confession, decisions of culpability and validity 
of confession judgments were explained by the DNA manipulation. 
Participant determination of confessor guilt and validity of confes-
sion were a function of exposure to the DNA condition when this 
evidence matched the confessor. Not only did DNA drive verdict 
choice and evaluations of confession, but it also interacted with 
Miranda manipulations on participants’ evaluation of obtaining 
a confession or provision of Miranda. Mean ratings differed as a 
function of DNA match. Disagreement was most pronounced when 
DNA did not match, even when warnings were provided. Presence 
or absence of Miranda warnings was important, but not as important 
as DNA evidence. 
Results indicate in general, participants’ evaluations of fo-
rensic-type evidence, specifi cally DNA, were considerably higher 
than confession evidence. Consistent with the CSI effect, both sur-
vey only and experimental condition mean ratings of reliability and 
probative validity of DNA evidence were high. When these per-
ceptions were organized within the experimental scenario, ratings 
decreased. When evidence relating to culpability is ambiguous or 
circumstantial and a confession is voluntary, participants were less 
reliant on the “concrete” confession evidence and focused more on 
the ambiguity, or lack of evidence. DNA existed in the “no match” 
condition, as did the confession, but guilt was not attributed to the 
confessor, and validity of confession was disbelieved. Belief in the 
confession was overwhelmingly driven by DNA corroboration. This 
fi nding provides evidence for a culpability or pro-prosecution bias 
concerning forensic-type evidence (O’Neil, 2007). 
The role of psychopathology and Miranda warnings in par-
ticipants decision-making process was important, but less so than 
DNA. These participants’ favorable attitude towards the interroga-
tion of mentally ill defendants may be due to the moral import of 
the offense (sexual assault and murder). The relationship of DNA 
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to other types of evidence and the relationship to verdict seemed to 
drive participant’s evaluations of other factors relating to the trial. 
Participants seemed to organize their evaluation of fact patterns in 
terms of their perception of the most salient factors relating to the 
ultimate issue. 
Why would mean ratings of reliability and probative validity 
of DNA evidence be higher than confession evidence? Patterns in 
these data suggest when evidence indicates guilt, it is assigned more 
probative weight. Conversely, when evidence appears exonerative it 
is relegated to a lesser probative status. Given the specifi c facts of 
the paradigm, a conviction bias may have emerged, whereby par-
ticipants seek evidence to confi rm what is perceived as necessary to 
do justice.
To our knowledge, this study is the fi rst to examine a vol-
untary confession paradigm and the factors involved in their evalu-
ations. It is important to point out, however, that the magnitude of 
participant-jurors’ responses to various evidential issues in this type 
of research study can be exaggerated due to the limited amount of 
information made available to them. This type of problem is not 
atypical in laboratory research summarizing complex legal and psy-
chological information. In this study, we attempted to minimize this 
problem by using ecologically valid materials including: the biog-
raphy of confessor, details about the abduction, confession, and the 
crime. We are confi dent that our approach to examining this topic 
drew on the strengths of both internal and external validity; howev-
er, we are also cognizant of researchers’ concerns when generalizing 
results involving judicial decision making (Bornstein, 1999; Myers 
& Greene, 2004). The value of this study is the insight offered into 
the infl uential effect of DNA in the presence of other legal and psy-
chological factors, e.g., psychopathology and Miranda warnings. 
Future research should address the confi guration of evidence type 
and fact patterns to assess discernable relationships and other sig-
nifi cant operating factors.
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APPENDIX
In 1995, a child was found dead in the woods behind her 
home. Police immediately focused on those who had a close rela-
tionship with her. After eliminating her parents, acquaintances, and 
relatives, the investigators were frustrated. Although they had DNA, 
they did not fi nd a matching suspect. Richard Tolman confessed 8 
years after the killing. 
The following is a summary of a confession provided by 
Richard Tolman, a 39-year-old schoolteacher. This man was never 
a suspect in the original murder investigation, although he had lim-
ited contact with the victim. Everything about his confession was 
voluntary, including making contact with investigators. Mr. Tolman 
received and waived his Miranda warnings before making any state-
ments. Richard Tolman was interrogated, but customary interroga-
tion tactics were not needed. Mr. Tolman provided detailed informa-
tion to investigators about how, when, where, and why he allegedly 
committed this act. Mr. Tolman insists, however, the death was an 
accident and not premeditated. 
Biography of Confessor
Richard Tolman was a married 5th-grade teacher at the time 
of the murder. He had no children of his own. He had no contact 
with law enforcement until 8 months after the murder, when he was 
charged with possession of child pornography. Investigators found 
pictures of the victim, clothed, on his computer. A plea-bargain and 
5 years of probation kept Mr. Tolman out of prison. He had pri-
or mental health contact, and was prescribed benzodiazepines for 
anxiety. A provisional diagnosis of pedophilia was charted, but Mr. 
Tolman did not satisfy all diagnostic criteria.
The Abduction
Investigator: Tell us how you got access to the victim.
Tolman: I gained her trust gradually. I saw her every once in 
a while because of my job. 
I loved her very much and didn’t want to hurt her. The day 
this happened, I couldn’t resist anymore so I told her I was supposed 
MOFFA AND PLATANIA     241
© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2008, 4(2)
to bring her home and she came with me. We had a special bond, her 
and I. I never meant to hurt her. I gave her a drink with diazepam 
(valium) crushed up in it and she got sort of lethargic. I knew it was 
my responsibility to care for her now, since she was so groggy, but 
I couldn’t stop myself anymore. She was beautiful to me. I took her 
to my apartment.
The Homicide
Investigator: Tell us about how she died.
Tolman: <tearful> I got angry when she resisted me. I think 
she actually hit or scratched my face. I also had klonopins (a benzo-
diazepine) and thought she would calm down if I mixed more in her 
drink. I said I was sorry and let her drink more while she watched 
TV. I started to make love to her again and she just didn’t respond, 
like she was ignoring me. But then I realized her breathing was re-
ally shallow. I was so nervous I thought I hurt her. I was afraid that 
she would blame me and hate me for hurting her. I wanted to show 
her how much she meant to me, but I just didn’t know what to do. I 
knew she loved me. I saw how she looked at me at school, so I was 
confused when she resisted. After we made love, I was hugging her 
and realized her breathing stopped. We got back in the car and drove 
to this area of woods that connects to her back yard. It was in the 
woods, about 100 yards from her back door, that I tucked her body 
into the ground and covered her. 
 DNA and Details of the Crime
When this crime took place, there was extensive media cov-
erage. Although case-sensitive details were guarded, much informa-
tion was nonetheless available. DNA was recovered from underneath 
the fi ngernails of the victim. There was no evidence of sexual assault 
other than small vaginal abrasions. No semen was recovered from 
the victim. Toxicology screenings showed no evidence of drugs in 
the victim’s system. Cause of death was strangulation by ligature. 
DNA found on the victim matched Richard Tolman.
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